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ABSTRACT
We lead off by discussing a number of theoreticalreasons for
expecting various relationships between a firm's unfunded pensionliability and
its market value. We then discuss our doubts about themethodology of earlier
papers which studied the empirical relation between funding and market value
using standard cross sectional techniques. A modified cross sectionalapproach
which alleviates some of these doubts, and a variable effect eventStudy meth-
odology which alleviates most of them are both employed to investigate the issues
raised in the first part of the paper. Our conclusion confirms thoseof earlier
studies that unfunded pension liabilities areaccurately reflected in lower
share prices.
Jeremy Bulow Randall Morck Lawrence Summers
Graduate School of Business National Bureau of Department of Economics
Stanford University Economic Research Littauer Center 229
Stanford, CA 914305 1050 Massachusetts Ave. Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138The question of how the stock market values pension assets andliabili-
ties is of central importance to corporate decision nakrs,financialeconDsts
and economists concerned with level of national savings. If investorstreat
pension debt differently from other forms of debt, in valuing firms, prudent
value maximizingmanagersshould recognize these differences and adjust their
pension funding policies acordingly. A convincing demonstration that market
valuations failed to take account of pension assets or liabilities would either
challenge prevailing theories of market efficiency and rational valuation, or
force a re—examination of conventional views about effectiveownership of pen-
sion claims. 'inally, if potential beneficiaries of pensionsrecognized the
value of the pensions and adjusted their savings accordingly, hutno comparable
adjustment occurred because holders of pension liabilities did not recognize
their liabilities, or were confident of their ability to shift then tosome
other source such as the PBGC, then pensions would reduce nationalsavings.
These effects might he quite significant,. Contributions to private pensions
represented 58 percent of personal savings in 1977.
A numberofempirical studies including Oldfield (1971), Feldst,ein and
Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Mrck (1983),Gersovitz (1980) and Westerfieli and
Marshall(1983) have attempted to study the markets valuation of pension liahi—
lities using cross—sectional valuation models. Other analysts have taken the
position that the overwiielming empirical evidence in supportofthe hypothesis
of market efficiency, makes studying the market valuation of pension assets and
liabilities irrelevant. This position seems unwarranted. A great deal of
controversy as reflected in Modigliani—Cohn (1971), Summers (1981) and French,—2—
Ruhackand Schwert (l993 focuses on the effects of inflation on firms! nominal
assets and liabilities. 51urthermore, if the supposition of rational valuation
isaccepted, studies of the market valuation effect of changes in pension liabi-
lities offer an ideal methodology for examining the true ownership of pension claims.
In adding to the already fairly extensive empirical literature on the
valuationof pension assets and liabilities, this paper makes two significant
innovations.First, we report results using a "variable effect" event study
methodology, for studying the valuation of pension claims. This methodology is
far superior to the traditional cross—sectional valuation model approach for
examiningthe determinants of market valuations. Indeed, we suggest that iden-
tification is highly problematic using standard approaches. Second, following
recent work by Bulow (1982), Lazear (1983), and others we recognize that pen-
sions may only he one aspect of complicated contracts through which firms offer
workersdeferred compensation. If deferred compensation is an important aspect
of the labor market, one would expect it to leave traces in the market valutions
of otherwise equivalent firms with demographically different labor forces. We
examinethis issue using both the standard cross—section and the "variable
effect" event study methodology. In addition to these innovations, the availa-
bility of a larger and more recent data set made it possible for us to repli-
cate the estimates presented in earlier studies and examine their robustness.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 examines the theoreti-
cal relationships between pension assets and liabilities and the market
valuation of firms. A number of possible reasons why unfunded pension liabili-
ties may not reduce equity valuations dollar for dollar are considered. Section—3—
IIpresents evidence on the relationship between pension obligations and rket
valuations using standard cross—sectional techniques. Other forms of deferred
compensation are also considered. Our doubts aboutcross—sectionalmethodolo-
gies are also discussed. Section III presents estimates of the eff'ect of pen-
sion obligations on market valuation using the variable effect event stu;
methodolo. We argue that this methodolo provides a superior basis for
testing market valuation issues than does the standard approach. While the
available evidence is weak, it does tend to corroborate standard theories
regarding the economic effects of pension obligations.Finally, Section I'Jpre-
sents our conclusions andsuggests directions for future research.—'4 —
1.V&L[JING A FIRM'S NET PENSION WEALTH
A nunber of empirical studies have attempted to examine the extent to
which market valuations of firm equity accurately reflect firms pension posi-
tions. These studies have typically not discussed in any detail how rational
investors should combine a firm's regular balance sheet and its pension position
in valuing it. It turns out, however, that because of complexities engendered
by the legalnature ofthe pension contract, the nature of the longterm implicit
contractsbetweenworkers and firms, and the tax code; the valuation of pension
assetsand liabilities is quite a subtle issue. This section begins by
sketchinga naive benchmark model for evaluating firms' pension positions and
then considers five qualifications to it. These qualifications provide the
basis for much of the empirical discussion in the next two sections.
Perhaps the simplest model of a defined benefit plan is the
"consolidated balance sheet" approach. In this approach, pension liabilities
are defined on a "quit" basis—— what workers would receive if they individually
quit the firm today, or their vested benefits——and those obligations are treated
like a general corporate liability. Pension assets are similarly treated as a
general corporate asset, so any difference between pension assets and liabili-
ties is part of net shareholder wealth. On this view unfunded pension liabili-
ties should reduce firms' market value dollar—for—dollar.
ERISA's Effect on the Pension Obligation
The first qualification to this simple model is that it does not take
into account the special legal nature of the pension liability. Prior to ERISA—5—
enployees' pension benefits were nonrecourse claims against corporate pension
assets. Because of the workers' nonrecourse claim we noild think of the firm's
net pension wealth as being an option on the fund's assets, F, with an exercise
price equal to V, vested benefits. If we think of the firm and its employees a
constantly negotiating over the levels of F and V so that either side alwas had
the ability to force immediate exercise of the option, then the firm's netpen-
sion wealth would he mx (o,_v), and workers' net pension wealth would be
min(F,V)
With the passage of ERISA firms are liable for varying sums denending
on the level of guaranteed benefits 0 (which in terminations in the first few
years of PBGC existence averaged •f'5 of vested benefits), accrued benefits A
(which because they include nonvested benefits slightly exceed vested benefits),
the amount of money in the pension fund F, and the market value of the firm's
equity F.
Following Ruby (l9B2) we can make a table of the firm's total pension
obligations and unfunded liability as a function of these four variables:
Table 1.1
Level of Funding Pension Liability Net Firm Liability
(i) F -i-.3E <0 F +.3E .3E
(2) G <F+.30c 0 +.3E 0 0—F
(3) G<F<A F o
R)A<F A F—A (overfunded)
Note that in case (1), a severely underfunded plan, the firm's pension
liability is less than the present value of worker's benefits. The difference
is nade up by the P300 through its "insurance" program, and is often referred to—6—
asthe pension put.
An empirical implication of the valuation mdcl implied in Table I is
the that firms with overfunded pensions (where F > A) are the residual claimants
in their plans and should benefit from increases in F (through plan asset
growth) and decreases in A (caused by interest rate increases that decrease the
present value of accrued benefits). Again in the case where 0 C F + .3E C 0 + .3F
the 'irm is the residual claimant. However, in cases (i) and (3), for vastly
underfunded plans and for those with 0 C A C F the firm is not the residual
claimant and should be unaffected by changes in pension asset and liability
values, Of course, if we realistically assume that pension policy cannot be
instantaneously revised then the firm nay he a partial gainer or loser fron
changes in pension asset and liability valuation. For example, following Sharpe
(1977) one might view the firm as having a call option on the assets of the Sund
F at an exercise price A, so changes in F and A change the value of that option
but not dollar for dollar with A—F. On average, though, we would expect firms
with overfanded pension plans to have valuations that are more sensitive to pen-
sion asset and liability values than firms with less well funded ulans. We test
this hypothesis in the next two sections.
Implicit Contracting
A second qualification to the benchmark analysis of pension obligations
is that one may be reluctant to take literally all the aspects of the employment
contract. For example, firns often raise the benefits of already retired
workers and workers nay find their pension benefits much higher if they leave a—7—
finn just after qualifying for early retirement rather than just before. A
literal view of individuals' pension wealth would say that increasing benefits
to retired workers is a gift of the firm and that a worker accumulates a large
amount of wealth the day he becomes eligible for early retirement. Neither
assumption seems very satisfying.
Bulow and Scholen (1983) make the argument that in fact. compensation is
negotiated cross—sectionally between a firm and its employees, either explicitly
through a union or implicitly. Workers bargain for part of the nuasi—rents
earned by firms and have some leeway as to how to split those rents among them—
selves. Their model allows for the possibility that sometimes a worker will he
paid much more than marginal product, such as when retirement benefits are
raised or early retirement eligibility is attained. Their measure of worker
compensation in a period is the salary, pension and other benefits legally
accrued during the period (the workers' extra compensation if they all left at
the end of the period rather than at its beginning) plus any increment in the
present value of the quasi—rents that the workers expect to be able to negotiate
with the firm. In particular, it is widely believed that workers benefit from
their firm's reinvestment in their industry. Bulow and Scholes argue the reason
is that even if such investment did not change the marginal product of the last
worker employed in the firm, average product would be greater and the workers
would be in a position as a group to negotiate greater compensation. Similarly,
increases in pension assets may affect the workers' bargaining ability with
their employers. A company with extra cash in its pension fund may find its
workers are able to bargain for a better deal, implying that part of any gain on—8—
thepension portfolio will find its way to the workers.
The Bulow—Scholes model has the empirical implication that workers
share in the gain or loss on the pension portfolio and, therefore, pension gains
and losses should only partially be reflected in stock prices. It most clearly
differs from the first qualification in its prediction of the treatment of
changes in net pension assets for vastly overfunded plans (>> A)where the
first qualification would predict that all incremental gains would go to
stockholders.
Pensions and Other Aspects of Compensation Arrangements
Third, it is extremely difficult to isolate pensions
the compensation contract. For example, a firm nay have more
arrangements for workers who leave before the early retirement
extra pay for staying until early retirement is much less than
pension plan because the gain in pension benefits is mitigated
severance pay. Other benefits such as health benefits and (in
especially) college tuition may also he spread unevenly accros
career. Thus looking at pension wealth in isolation may he an
wealth is correlated with other nonhalance sheet compensation.
ost importantly, pension contributions are less than
salary for most firms and have been decreasing for the past two years. Clearly
small percentage changes in salary can cancel much larger percentage changes in
pensions.
The implication of all this is that we know little about how the pen—
from the rest of
generous severance
date. If so, the
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sionobligation correlates with Other elements of the ccnpensation package. If
there is a correlation between firms with large gross pension liabilities and
firms with older workers, say, and older workers get overpaid regardless of the
nature 0f the firm's pension plan, then a relation between large tension liabi-
lities and low firm valuation my he due to the correlation of those liabilities
with the age composition of the firm's labor force. In Section 2 we make preli-
minary tests of whether steep wage/age profiles and older labor forces are
correlated with firms' stock market value.
TaxEffects
Thefourth issue which causes significant conceptual difficulty in
valuing a firm's net claim on its pension fund is taxes. For simplicity we will
confine our analysis here primarily to the case of an overfunded plan, making the
assumption that the firm can use any excess assets to reduce future pension
costs and thus bear the entire risk of changes in pension asset and liability
values. Therefore, we will he placing an upper bound on the value of an
increment in pension assets to a firm.
We limit our discussions to three tax issues that have not received
wide attention among pension researchers. The first is an explicit calculation
of the value of being overfunded. The second is the implications of that
calculation for changes in pension asset and liability valuation. The third is
simply that overfunding a pension fund can serve many of the sane purposes as a
stock repurchase, with better tax implications. We use as an arbitrary
benchmark a plan which is always funded at the level of accrued benefits.
(Defined contribution plans are generally like this.) We compare such a plan—19—
with one where the plan is funded at some level c(s) at time s where F(s) may
differ from the level of accrued benefits. Then it is easy to show that the tax
advantage to having a defined benefit plan is equal to the present value of
interest earned on pension assets in excess of pension liabilities, times the
tax rate on pension contributions.
To illustrate this point we introduce the following notation: Let r =
pre—taxmarket interest rate
11 =marginaltax rate of the firm
12 =implicittax rate the firm pays on investment income; that is its after—tax
discount rate is r(l—t2)
F(s) =amountof money in pension fund at time s
B(s) =benefitspaid at time s.
We compare the tax benefits of beginning a plan at time t, making an
initial contribution F(t), and subsequently operating with funding at level F(s)
versus making an initial contribution of A(t) and subsequently renaming fully
funded at level A(s).
With funding maintained at level t'(s) the present value of after—tax
future pension contributions needed to supply a benefit stream B(s is
(1.1) (l—T1)F(t) +(1_Il)j(F(s)+B(s)—rF(s))e ds
t
The present value of contributions to a plan that is always fully
funded is
—r(l—t0)(s—t)
(1.2) (l—i1)A(t) +(1_Il)5(A(s)+B(s)—rA(s))e ds—11—
The tax saving from funding at level F is simply (3) minus (2) or
(1.3) Tax Saving =rT2(1_11)TtF(s)—A(s) eT25_t)ds
It should be clear that the way to maximize (1.3) is to set F(s) as
high as possible at each moment. In such a simple model, then, firms will
always be up against their IRS funding limitation.
What is theimplication for firm valuation of a shockto the value of
F(s)orA(s)? First, consider a rise in F(s). With increased excess funding
the firm would get larger tax benefits. It would amortize its "experience gain"
on asset performance as slowly as possible. If amortization occurs over T years
annual pension contributions will drop by rAF/(l_e_rT) where AF is the gain in





This formula is most understandable by considering some extreme cases. irst,
asume 12 =0:there is no tax paid on investment income earned outside the pen-
sion fund. Then there is no advantage to funding per se and an increase in F of
one dollar will raise firm value by 1—1,, the amount of money the firm would get
if it were able to immediately withdraw the extra dollar from the plan. Second,
consider the oft—considered case where12 =11
='r:the implicit tax rate on
corporate non—pension investment income is the same as the corporate marginal
rate of T (generally considered 146 percent). This view is consistent with that
of Miller's (1977) model of corporate finance. Furthermore, assume that T =—12—
the increment in pension assets does not have to be amortized and the firm may
be overfunded by an extra dollar forever. Then the increment in firm value is
AF. Of this gain of AF, then, F(l—'t) is created because the value of assets in
the pension fund (which holds pre—tax assets) has risen by AF. Also, because
those F dollars will earn returns of rAP' each year forever instead of r(l—t)AF
as non—pension assets would earn, there is an annual saving in pension costs of
rid? because of the tax—sheltered nature of the pension returns. The after—tax
value of this saving is riAF(l—T). If we discount this saving at the after—tax
rate of r(l—T), we find that the present value of the tax saving from being able




If in fact we assume 15 years amortization of excess funding, that
'I ='2
=.146,and that pre—tax interest rates are 10 percent, then (1.14) implies
that a firm's value should rise by approximately 12 cents for each dollar its
pension assets rise in value. There is an asymmetry on the loss side in that
while excess assets will be defunded as slowly as possible asset shortfalls will
be made up as quickly as allowed. Of course, if a funding deficiency could he
made up instantly then the cost to a firm of a decline in the value of its
pension assets would he 5)4 cents. Because of the asymmetry firms have a
mitigatedincentive to establish "dedicated" bond portfolios which preclude
gains or losses on a fraction of their pension obligations.
Changes in the value of pension liabilities are a bit more
complicated.The reason is that funding limitations are based on the book valueof liabilities rather than market value. If interest rates rise, causing the
valueof liabilities to fall, in the short run the firm will he sore overfunde
than before. This overfunding will only be recognized for funding limitation
purposes through the channel of the firm's pension assets earning a return
greater than the plan's actuarial rate. As these greater returns are earned
each year they must then be amortized as experience gains. Thus changes in
liability values will end up being effectively amortized more slowly than
changes in asset values and a slightly higher coefficient would he expected is
the sensitivity of firm value to changes in pension liabilities than to changes
in pension assets.
Finally, we note the large amount of corporate stock and other assets
held in private pension plans. Numerous firms hold pension assets in excess of'
the market value of firm equity. Because pension contributions are
tax—deductible, except for the fact that transfer of assets to a pension fund
may involve a transfer of corporate wealth from stockholders to employees
pension overfunding seems to dominate corporate share repurchases on two
grounds. First is the deductibility of contributions, and second the fund can
use money to hold a wider variety of assets than just the firm's own stock. As
such, we might expect excess pension fund contributions to provide a signalling
role much like that of dividends and repurchases. Rowever, we leave this last
point for future research.
Investor Rationality
A fifth reason that changes in firms' pension assets and liabilities—1 '4—
maynot be reflected dollar—for—dollar in stock prices is that the market maY he
inefficientin valuing pension liabilities. While this reason may seem
implausible, concern over the effect of large pension contributions on reported
earnings may he one of the reasons that managements often contribute ioh lesc
to their pension funds than they are permitted by TES regulations.
Other studies such as Prench, Ruhack, and Schwert (1993) have
indicated that it is difficult to find the effect of the change in the market
value of conventional debt on stock prices. Pension debt, which does not appear
on corporate balance sheets and has only recently appeared in any form in the
footnotes, may thus he discounted by the market because of its comolexity.
In this section we have discussed a number of reasons why a naive
model of changes in a firm's net pension wealth being reflected
dollar—for—dollar in stock market valuation may fail. In particular, we have
discussed the details of ERISA, implicit contracting issues, the correlation
between pension and nonpension compensation, tax effects, and investor
rationality in valuing pension claims. In the subsequent sections cf the paper
we attempt to estimate what in fact is the relation between a firm's pension
assets and liabilities and the market value of its equity.—15—
2. CROSS—SECTIONAL VALUATIONMODELS
Theectent to which share prices reflect unfunded pension ohligctions
is a key issue in considering the effect of private pensions on national
savings. It has been argued (Feldstein l98) that if unfunded pension
liabilities are not fully reflected in stock prices, equity owners will save
lessand consume more than they would in a world where perceptions were correct.
National savings might thus he reduced by the introduction of private pensions.
For this reason and because of intrinsic interest as an aspect of
financial behavior a series of pioneering papers including Oldfield (l91),
Feldstein and Seligman (1981), Gersovitz (1980), and Feldstein and Mrck (1953)
have endeavored to explore this issue. These efforts have focused on listing
variables likely to he determinants of a firms market value. If an effect of
unfundedpension liabilities on market value can he detected after these ot}er
likelyfactors are controlled for, the studies conclude that unfunded pension
obligations influence share prices.
Feldstein and Mrck (1983), for example, nodel a firm's market value
(v)perdollar of net assets (A) as depending on the firms future earrings
potential, its riskiness, its leverage, and (perhaps) its pension obligations.
(2.1) =F(ture earnings potential, risk, leverage, unfunded pension
liability)
As proxies for future earnings potential, they use the firm's current earnings
(E), its historical growth rate in earnings (GEOW) and its research and develop-
ment spending (RD). They enloy the firm's beta as a measure of risk, and the
market value of its debt as a fraction of net assets as a leverage indicator.1
—lo—
The firm's unfunded vested pension liability (UVPL) per dollar of net assets is
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They found a coefficient of about minus one on unfunded vested pension liabili-
ties, and concluded that an added dollar of net pension obligations depresses
the firm's market value by about one dollar. Their study was plagued by fairly
difficult data problems ——primarilyby the use of only very coarse inflation
adustnents and by the very small size of their sample.
Preliminary to this study, we replicated the Feldstein/Mtrck
regressions using a much larger body of more recent data. Although their result
could he reproduced, it was quite unstable. Seemingly innocuous changes in the
sanple made it come or go. The estimated coefficients on the proxies for future
earnings potential ——especiallyon GROW ——werealso disturbingly unstable.
In this section, we shall point out severe problems inherent in the
cross—sectional valuation methodolo' used by these previous authors. We then
suggest alternative more satisfactory cross—sectional estimating equations.
Estimation of these equations yields results consistent with Feldstein and
Mtrck's conclusion that pension liabilities are largely reflected in a firms
market valuation.
Problems with the Cross—Sectional Valuation
The lack of robustness of the Felstein—Mrck equations when replicated—11—
for a larger sample using, more recent data calls into question the vaildit' of
thecross—sectional valuation methodology used by then and other authors. Th±r
inference is supported by the conflicting evidence found in previous
cross—sectional valuation studies. eldstein and Selignan (12R1', for example,
obtain results similar to those of Feldstein and Mtrck; while Cldfiel.d (lY7)
found no such relation.
It should not he surprising that such cross—sectional studies lead to
conflicting inferences about the valuation of pension liabilities. It is not at
all clear in what sense these equations can he said to identify structuralpara-
metersof any interest. Standard financial theory postulates that the value of
a firm Ky)nay heexpressed either as the sun of assets (A.) and liabilities (L.
1
or as the present value of future cash flows (CF) discounted at some rates.
These two alternatives may be written as:
n in








Note that neither of these equations includes an error tern. The standard
procedure in estimating a cross—sectional valuation equation seems to he to
deflate both sides of (2.3) by an estimate of the replacement value of the
firm's capital stock, insert proxies for whatever assets and liabilities are
easily measured in the equation, and then try to adhere to the spirit of
equation (2.it) in adding to the equation measures of earnings and earningsgrowth to cover for assets and liabilities which are hard to measure. easoning
of this sort appears to guiie the specification of Feldstein—rck and the
earlier work of Tobin and Brainard (1911) upon which they rely.
It is difficultto knovhoi to interpret the error term in rich a
mongrelequation. Presumably it reflects unmeasured assets or liabilities. Put
since the opportunity cost of purchasing these assets (incurring these
liabilities) is not being able to purchase measured assets (not incurring
measured liabilities), it is hard to believe that the error is orthogonal to the
included balance sheet variables. Furthermore, since earnings depend on the
assets and liabilities held by a firm it is difficult to see how they could he
orthogonal to the error term in the cross—section. As a consequence it seems
very difficult to interpret the coefficients of equations such as those reported
by the authors who have previously examined the market valuation of pension
obligations. Since almost every right—hand side variable in standard valuation
equationsis endogenous, adequate instruments donot seem to be available for
estimatingthe parameters of the standard hedonic equation consistently. Given
these prohlens, instability in the estimated coefficients is not surprising.
Even if the parameters of standard hedonic market valuation equations could be
estimated consistently serious problems of interpretation would remain. The
standard procedure for using these equations to answer questions about pension
obligations involves focusing on the coefficient on the pension variables in the
equation. For example, a coefficient of —l on the UVPL variable was to he
interpreted as meaning that if a firm gets an extra dollar in its pension fund,
its value will rise by one dollar.—19—
This conclusion is unwarranted.If the firm contributes a dollar to
its pension fund, current earnings are reduced by one dollar. Taken literally
the Feldstein—Mrck equation implies that this decrement would reduce market
value by alnost two dollars. The presence of the grofth variable makes the
situation even more complex. It is clear, however, that simply looking at the
pension variable will not he satisfactory. A similar problem of inference holds
with respect to the R&D and debt variables in hedonic valuation equations.
We conclude that the standard hedonic equation approach is not a
useful instrument for studying the nErket valuation of pension liabilities. In
the remainder of this section, we modify the standard cross—sectional approach
by using only balance sheet variables to explain firm valuations. The next
sectionuses an alternative variable effect event study nethodoloj to study the
questions at hand.
ModifiedCross—Sectional Equations
In the remainder of this section we estimate equations relating to
market valuation of firms only to items that can he thought of as elements in
their balance sheet. This avoids the problems of interpretation discussed in
the previous section although the possibility of inconsistent parameter
estimates remains. In particular the equation we estimate is of the form:




A =replacementcost of firm
RD =researchand development spending
BETA =beta
DEBT =marketvalue of firm's debt
UVPL. =unfundedvested pension liabilities
D. =twodigit SIC industry code dummies
Our data for 1930 and 1931 is constructed exactly as described by
Feldstein and Mrck's (19814) numbers with a few exceptions which are explained
below. The reader is referred to the earlier paper for a detailed account of
the data. Following Myers (1983) comments, an unlevered rather than a standard
BETAis used here. We also make use of inflation adjusted figures that have
recently become available. In this study we use inflation adjusted asset
figures from the Financial Accounting Standards Board's statement 33 (FASB 33).
Our replacement cost number A is the inflation—adjusted value of property plan
andequipment plus the inflation—adjusted value of inventories. Our pension
numbers were taken from the Financial Accounting Standards Board's statenent 36
(FASB36).Pension liabilities are adjusted to reflect a common discount rate
of seven percent.
Dummiesfor two digit industries are included in the equation to
capture the notion that different types of physical capital are valued
differently in the marketplace. The estimation results for 1979, 1980 and 1981
are shown in Table 2.1. Like the Feldstein Mrck conclusion the results for all
three years suggest that firms' market values do reflect their pension—21—
obligations. In each case the parameter estimates i1y that firms' market
values are reducedmorethan dollar—for—dollar with unfunded pension liabilities
though the hypothesis that =—1can never herejected.
One possible objection to these questions is the "weak firm" problen
raised by Myers (1983) in his comments on the Feldstein—Mrck paper and
confirmedby Bodie, Light, Mrck and Taggart (19814) as an important effect.
Firms with low value assets will tend to have low market values and because of
financial pressure will tend to underfund their pension funds. As a result a
spurious negative association between firm value and unfunded pension
liahilities may be observed. This is addressed in Table 2.2 by using two
different techniques.
First, in the equations in the left half of the table a variable PATIPIi
is included reflecting the firm's Standard & Poor's bond rating is added to the
specification. The RATING variable takes values ranging from 1 for firns rated
D by S&P to 10 for firms ranked A.AA. It should be at least a partial control
forweal: firm effects.
Second,in the second half of the table UVPL is treated as an endoqe—
nous variable and is instrumented using the firm's total pension liabilities.
The justification is that the total size of the firm's liabilities is indepen-
dent of its funding policy, and so should he a satisfactory instrument. It
obviously should also be correlated with the firm's level of unfunded liabili-
ties and so should provide reasonably efficient estimates.
The results unambigu.osly and robustly point to a negative relationshio
between a firm's unfunded vested pension liabilities and its market value.—22—
Using eitherof our two procedures for controlling for weak firm effects, the
absolutevalue of the UVPL coefficient actually increases. While the standard
errors are large, we are able to find no evidence that weak firm problems
accountfor these results, suggesting that the market penalizes firms with
unfunded pension liahiities.
The discussion in the previous section suggested that the marginal
effect of reduced pension liabilities nay he different for underfunded than for
overfundedplans. The analysis of section 1 implies that generally stockholders
will gain more from a reduction in an already overfunded plan, because unfunded
liabilities will be put in part to the PBGC and in part to employees. We
address this issue by adding a variable PUT to the specification of equation
(2.5). The variable PUT is defined as Max (0, JNPL). Results are shows in
Table 2.3.
Unfortunately,the data do not appear to be powerful enough to rej cot
anyinteresting hypothesis concerning this issue. In the nore reliable 1990 and
1981equations, there is very weak evidence that the availability of the pension
put influences the marginal valuation of liabilities for troubled firms.
A final major issue suggested by the discussion in Section 1 is the
role of other deferred compensation arrangements which may he correlated with
our included pension variables. Firms may have implicit contracts with their
workers which require them to pay older workers in excess of their marginal
products. If so the capitalized value of these obligations represents a
liability of the firm. This liability is of interest in its own right. In
addition, it is likely to he correlated with pension liabilities.—23—
Unfortunately, there is no apparent way to construct an estimate of
firm's deferred compensation liability. As a crude apDroximation, we added
three variables to equation 2.3; AGE, SLOPE, and AGExSLOPE where AGE is an
estimate of the average age of a firm's workforce, SLOPE is an estimate of the
slope of its age—wage profile and AGExSLOPE should enter the equation negati-
vely. Firms with steep age—wage profiles and old work forces should have the
largest deferred compensation liability. The other variables cannot he sirrned
on an a triori basis.
Our estimates of AGE and SLOPE were obtained from a merge of the
January and March l98 Current Population Survey tapes. This collention of
data included the ages, wages, tenures and three digit employer industry codes
for over forty thousand individuals. Parameters of an age distribution and an
age vs. log(wage) profile were estimated for each three digit industry code.
These codes were matched to the SIC codes on the comnustat tape. In general a
three digit CPS industry code corresponded to a 3 digit or in a few cases a
four digit SIC code. Each firm in our sample was thus assigned a wane—age
profile corresponding to its SIC industry code.
The results of estimating equation (2.5) with the additional
variables AGE, SLOPE and AGExSLOPE are displayed in Table 2.1.. They are
disappointing. The 1980 estimates are consistent with the hypothesis advanced
above. The age—slope interaction variable is both satistically and suhstan—
tively significant. However, its sign is reversed with equal statistical
significance in the 1981 equation. As a consequence, we cannot reach amy
judgement about the role of deferred compensation in affecting firm—24 —
valuations.However, our results suggest tha taking account of several
deferred compensation liabilities does not alter the estimates of the
influence of unfunded pension liahilities.—25—
3. INTERESTRATE CHANGED AND THE VALUATION OF PENSION LIABILITIES
Thissection uses an alternative methodoloi' to circumvent some of the
problemsin the standard cross—sectional approach discussed in the preceding
section.The essential insight underlying our tests may he illustrated as
follows. Consider two otherwise equivalent firms one of which has more pension
liabilities than the other. Now suppose the nominal long—term interest rate
rises unexpectedly. The firm with rre pension liabilities shoul do relatively
better than the firm with less liabilities because of the greater capital gain
itexperiences as the higher interest rate unexpectedly erodesthe value of
long—termobligations. By examining the response of firms with different
pension obligations to interest rate changes, it should be possible to determine
the extent to which the market values changes in the status of a firm's pension
fund.
Because the approach taken here looks at the effect of an exogenous
event,a change in the interest rate on the valuation of different firms, it
does not depend on any assumption about how firms decide how much to fund their
pension plan. Thus the variable effect event study method used here is not
subject to the weak firm problem described in the previous section.
More formally our approach is as follows. We postulate that the
return on firm i, in month t, can be expressed as:
(3.1)p. =a+p+u
it 1ittit
where is the normal required expected return on firm i, and it reflects its
sensitivity to interest rate news, here proxied by the change in the long—term
interest rate, and is a random error tern. 1Ye initially specify that—26—
depends on the firm's characteristics at time t according to:
Trf
(3.2) it = +iiLv
it+ 2 + Z.tY+Li
where TJVPL represents unfunded vested pension liabilities. LTD reoreseots boo—
term debt, Z referstocontrol variables discussed in moredetail below,and 7
is the equity value of the firm. Combining equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields the




= +tIC + Il + 127+ Z.t11 + u., +
it
Fauation (3.3) canbe estimated given cross—section time series data usinc
ordinaryleast squares, to yield unbiased estimates of the parameters. However,
the error term does not satisfy the requirements for consistency of the standard
errors. In the results reported below we allow for the inclusion of firm aod'or
period effects in (3.3). This should make it possible to compute approximately
accurate standard errors.
Our procedure is entirely consistent in spirit with the vect stuy
methodolor that is widely used in financial economics. The anproach imvolvs
lookingat the response of securities prices to unexpected develonments or
"news" in an effort to gauge the effects of the variables heinc studied on firms
market value. Our "variable effect—event study methodolopr" represents an
improvement over the techniques normally used in finance in two ways.
First, the events we look at are developments that are exogenous from— 2—
theviewpoint of the firm. A standard event study approach to the problem of
studying how the market values firms pension liabilities would involve looking
at how firms' market value responded to news about their pension funding deci-
sion. The difficulty is that firm's decisions are themselves responses to news,
or to privately held information. It is not really possible to sort outthe
effects of policy changes from the independent effects of their causes. Our
indirect procedure of looking at the differential efects of interest rate
changes on firms entirely avoids these problems. Second, our econoetric proce-
dure is superior to the grouping techniques normally used in event studies. One
could, as many financial economists would, group as firms bypensionfunding
status, and then look at how different portfolios responded to news about
interest rate developments. Such a procedure simply discards information about
within—group differences in pension funding status and therefore is inefficient.
Before turning to a description of our data, it is useful to discuss
the expected signs of the coefficient in (3.3) and possible biases arising fron
omitted variables. We expect l and 12 to be positive reflecting the capital
gains firms earn on their nominal liabilities as interest rates reduce the value
of outstanding liabilities. The principal problem in estimating (3.3) is that
some long—term nominal assets or liabilities which might be correlated with the
included variables are excluded. These might include the value of depreciation
in tax shields or of prospective lease obligations. If these variables have a
systematic impact on firms' pension funding decisions, our results will he
biased. However, we know of no previous arguments suggesting a role for these
variables in pension funding decisions. They might, however, be related to the—2 9—
amount of long term debt a firm decides to carry.
In estimating equation (3.3) we use data for the 36—month period
from January, 1979 to December 1991. We assume that pension assets and liabili-
ties are constant within each year1. Data on pension assets and liabilities are
drawn from a tape provided by the EASE. Liabilities are adjusted to current
interest rates using the rule of thumb described in Feldstein and Mtrok (1983).
Essentially, this procedure involves railtiplying reported liabilities by the
ratio of the actuarially assuned interest rate to the actual market interest
rate. This is done on a monthly basis. The market value of long—term debt is
calculated from information available on the Conpustat tape. It is assumed that
all debt reported as long—term by Conpustat has a 10—year maturity and a 10 per-
cent coupon rate. This debt is then valued using the monthly EM interest rate.
onthly stock returns are drawn from the CROP tapes. To insure robustness
extreme values of the right—hand side variables were eliminated from the sample.
All necessary data were available for about 200 firms in 1979, about 7O firms
in 1980 and about itocfirmsin 1991 giving us a total of 12,715 observations in
a 36—month sample period.
The results of estimating (3.3) omitting any Z variables are reported
in Table 3.1 for various specifications of the error term. In some cases is
treated as a constant, in others it is allowed to vary across firms, and in
others to vary from nnth to month.
1An alternative which we intend to explore would involve interpolating net
assets and liabilities within years.—29—
The results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that the narket
values pension obligations rationally. In each case the unfunded liability
variable is both substantively and statistically significant. The estimates in
column (1) for exanple imply that for a firm with unfunded liabilities equal to
10 percent of equity value, a one percent increase in the interest rate would
raise market value by about .3percent.While this is only about half the value
thatwould be predicted by a naive mdel in which firms "owned" all unfunded
liabilities and none of the other complicating factors discussed in the first
section arose, it seems very reasonable especially in light of tax
considerations.
In all the equations the debt variable has the wrong sign and it is
highly statistically significant in equations (1) and(2). This finding con—
firns the results of French Buhack and Schwert (1903) who were unable to find
any evidence in support of the nominal credit hypothesis.It also supports the
Modigliani—Cohn inflation illusion hypothesis. These surprising results may
alternatively be a consequence of our short sample period or of our failureto
accurately measure all the firms' nominal assets and liabilities. In any event,
they stand as a major puzzle. We recognize that it is inplausihleto assert as
our results seen to suggest that market participants recognizethe effects of
increases in interest rates on pension debt but not on regular balancesheet
debt. But we do not at this point have any resolution to offer.
Our results are somewhat less unsatisfactory for equation (3) where
month dummies are included in the specification. The unfunded pensionliahili—
ties variable remains statistically significant in (3) ,althoughits substantive—30—
significance is mach less than that suggested by equations (1) and (2.The
debt variable, thought it continues to have the wrong sign, becomes insignifi-
cant in equation (3).
Further Tests
A major problem withthecross—sectional valuation tests presented in
the previous section was the "weak firm" problem. Firms with capital that can-
not earn a high rate of return tend to find themselves in financial trouble and
try to underfund their pension plans. A negative relationship between firm
valueand unfunded pension liabilities is observed hut may well he spurious.
Both low firm value and underfunding of the pension liability are consequences
of the firm's ownership of the unprofitable assets. There is no reason to
expect a similar problem here. Weak firms should not be differentially affected
by changes in the nominal interest rate. However, as a further check we added a
variable IRRATING to equation (2) in Table 3.1, where RATING is a categorical
variable which ranges from 1 for firms whose debt is rated P to 10 for firms
whose debt is rated AM. The estimated equation was:
(3,14) p=a+AR[(25,7(TJVPL)—22.6LTD —3.11RATING+20.3]
it 1 (111.0) (6.2)('.6) (111.2)
Whilethe RATING interaction variable enters significantly, it does not have an
important influence on the pension variable's coefficient, which rises sliahtly.
The introduction of RATING has little effect on the anomalous debt coefficient.
A concern in previous pension research has been whether the market
responds to pension liahilities as measured at market or actuarial interest—31—
rates.The equations reported so far in this section assume that liabilities
are valued at market interest rates. To test this assumption we add an addi-
tional variable to equation (2) in Table 3.1 equal to A9(PLA -PLM)where
PLMisthe pension liabilityvalued at market—interest rates and PIP is the pen-
sion liability valued at actuarial interest rates. If the market responds to
actuarialinterest rates rather than market rates, one would expect that this
variable would have a positive sign. The estimated equation was:
(3.5) p.=a.+AR!23.6(uvpL) +29.9(PLA_pLM)—12.5—12.5] it 1 (12.3) (12.7) (2.1) (2.1)
This equation provides very weak evidence that actuarial interest rates
influence market valuations. It appears that firms who overstate their pension
liabilities by re gain more when interest rates rise. These results ar in
accord with the results obtained in the preceding section using a dif'ferent
methodological approach. They do also support the claim of' Feldstein and orok
(1983) that market participants appear to use below market interest rates in
valuing pension liabilities.
The results in the previous section provided evidence that the nension
put and the possibility of bankruptcy influenced the market's valuation of pen-
sion liabilities. This issue can be examined by investigating whether interest
rate changes have smaller effects for firms with large relative pension liabili-
ties. This issue can be examined by investigating whether interest rate changes
have smaller effects for firms with large relative pension liabilities. We exa-
mine this issue by adding a variable AR PUT to our basic equation where PUT =—32—
Ax(o,UVPL).Our hypothesis is that the coefficient on this variable will be
negative but smaller in absolute value than the coefficient on (UVPL). This
reflects the attenuated impact of interest rate changes on badly underfunded
firms discussed in Section 1. The estimation result was:
(3.6) p.=+ R[33.T(PL-PA)-165PUT -6.9-12.01
it 1 (10.7) (99) (3.5) (2.1)
Although the coefficient on the put variable is statistically insignificant
because it cannot be esti ted with any accuracy, its magnitude is consistent
with our hypothesis. This evidence thus dovetails with the evidence in the pre-
ceding section on potential importance of the level of unfunded benefits.
A final issue to he considered is the relationship between a firm's
pension arrangements and other parts of its compensation scheme. In the pre-
vious section we presented some crude tests of the idea that firms with steep
age earnings profiles and aging work forces were valued by the market as if they
had a formal debt liability to their work force. While the results were
inconclusive, taking acount of this liability did not have a large iract on the
estimated effect of pension obligations on firms' market valuations.
It would he desirable to exanine these questions using the methodology
of this section. However, a serious problem presents itself. Any long—term
implicit contract between workers and firms is likely to be formulated in real
terms. The changes in interest rates which provide the basis for our tests
largely reflect changing inflationary expectations. Separating out real
interest rate changes in monthly data is probably not feasible. Hence we cannot0—
inthis section shed raich light on the existence of nonpension—deferred compen-
sation. On the possibility that interest rate changes over our lYI9l sannle
period night reflect real interest rate variations, or that nonpensinn long—term
contractsmightbe nominally denominated, we re—estimated equation (3.3) with
variouswagegrowth and age structure variables included. In no case did they
entersignificantly or affect the magnitude of the pension coefficients.
Therefore,no results are displayed here. We reluctantly conclude that this
section's method cannot be used to exanine the important deferred compensation
issue.— ?—
)4 OONCLUSIO"S
The results in this paper confirms earlier analyses suggesting tha
the stock market valuation of firms reasonably accurately reflects their per.sion
funding situations. This conclusion is reached using alternative methodological
approaches and data from several different years and so is reasonably robust.
In particular we demonstrate that it is not simply a consequence of weak firm
effects. Our results also suggest that the availability of the termination an-i
the pension put influences the market valuation of pension liabilities.
Finally, we provide some evidence suggesting that market valuations of firms
reflect implicit contractual liabilities to pay older workers amounts in excess
of their marginal products. These contractual liabilities appear to be denomi-
nated in real rather than nominal terms.
Our results provide no support for the notion that investors ignore
pension liabilities in valuing firms. As a consequence, they suggest that cor-
porate managers will benefit if they fund their plans as fully as possible.
Furthermore, they suggest that the private pension may not have a large effect
on aggregate saving since both the asset and liability side of pension balance
sheets influence private savings decisions.
Perhpas the most promising area suggested for future research is the
market's valuation of implicit contractual liabilities to older workers. It
would he desirable to extend the tests reportd here in order to get an estimate
of the value of this liability. If it were to be significant, strong evidence
would he provided for incentive contracting models of the labor market.—35—
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Balance Sheet, Approach to easuring theInact ofUnfunded
VestedPension Liabilities on Firn Valuation
Dependent Variable: Market VAlueOverReplacement cost V/A
Year 1919 1980 191
Unfunded vested liabilities UVPL/A _l.112 —1.5 —1.16
(1.17) (0.70) 0.5fl)
Leverage DEBT/A 1.06 —0.16 —0.32
(0.31) (0.33) (0.21)
Research RD/A 6.9L 10.75 1.5
(2.18) (1.51k) (1.12)
3eta BETA 0.18 0.08 0.06
(0.15)(0.13) (o.o)
Constant C 0.19 0.56
(0.21) (0.30) (0.15)
Sample N 266 256
0.39 .53TABLR 2.2
Balance Sheet Approach to Measuring the Impact of Unfunded
Vested Pension Liahilitj on Firm Valuation and the Weak Firm Problea
Dependent Variable: Market Value Over Replacement Cost V/A
Year 1980 1981 1990 l9l
Unfonded Vested Liabilities TJVDL/A —1.92 —1)45 —3.15
(0.93) (0.69) (1.63) (1.15)
Rating RATING 0.05 o.oL
(0.06)
Leverage DEBT/A —0.06 —O.2L 0.052 0.30
(0.30) (939) (o.2L)
Research RD/A o.65 7)43 12.27
(1.37) (1.76) (1.22)
Beta BETA 0.03 0.08 —0.10 0.05
(0.20) (o.os) (0.15) (o.ofl
Constant C o.i6 0.65
(0.90) (0.33) (0.32) (0.17)
Sample N 153 17 2562
0)45 0.52—39—
TABLS 2.3
Balance Sheet Approach to Measuring the Impact of Unfunded
Vested Pension Liabilities on Firm Valuation and the PBGC Put
Dependent Variable: Market Value Over Replacenent Cost V/A
Year 1919 l9O l91
Unfunded Vested LiabilitiesUVPL/A 0.75 —2.63 —l.9
(i.o)
PBGCPutIndicator PUT —2.65 1.3 0.61
(.21) (2.16) (i.hL)
Leverage DEBT/A 1.03 —0.16 —0.32
(0.31) (0.33) (0.21)
Research RD/A 7.02 10.65 7)9
(2.20) (1.55) (i.1)
Beta BETA 0.01 0.06
(o.I6) (0.13) (n.o)
Constant C 0.23 0.55 0.66
(0.23) (0.30) (0.16)
Sample N 70 266 256
R2 0.39 0.53TABLE 2.b
Balance Sheet ADproach to the Impact of Pensions and Labor
Force Structure on Firm Valuation
Dependent Variable: Market Value Dyer Replacement Cost V/A
Year 1980 1981
Mean age AGE 0.05 —0.03
(o.o) (0.03)
Slopeof age wage profile SL0E lUh.14h
(6r.o9) (62.52)
Age and slope interaction term AGExSLDPE 1.66
(1.62)
Unfunded vested liabilities TJVPL/A —1.99
(0.90)
Leverage DEBT/A —0.39 —0.2w
(o.3) (0.22)
Research RD/A 11.06 7.90
(1.87) (1.25)
Beta BETA 0.08 0.07
(0.15) (o.oL)
Constant C —1.38 1.82
(1.9) (1.30)
Sample N 233 234
0J40 0.55TABLE 3.1
Theeffect ofinterest) rate changes on monthlystock returns reflected tYrcnrr'i
pension assets and liabilities as well as fror. loss tern debt.
Equation (1) (2)
Unfunded vested 30.6 29.2 29.1
pension liabilities (lO.L) (lO.U) (0.1fl)
x11B
Longtern debt —8.05 —T.9T
x (3.2) (3.3) (2.n5)




Firm Effects no yes no
'onthEffects no no yes
Sample 12,563 12,563 12,563
l.93 l.97° 29.9°1